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Despite the discipline having undergone a ‘peace turn’ in recent years, the history of the peace movement itself
remains curiously under explored by geographers. This paper retraces the World Peace Brigade and its
collaboration with the Northern Rhodesian independence movement in 1962. I argue that the Brigade offers
geographers important insights into how ideas of peace have been circulated, adapted and even resisted. The
paper suggests that geography poses a distinct conceptual problem for peace movements, which must
simultaneously operate beyond conventional forms of territorial politics while remaining sufficiently flexible in
the political arena for their strength and relevance. In Central Africa this meant the Brigade developed two,
ultimately incompatible, conceptions of peace: an internationalist one that stressed world community, and a local
one that adapted pacifism for nationalist movements. I suggest this case study has two implications for peace
research in geography. First, it encourages us to remain attentive to the big stories of peace and, specifically, the
way in which the peace movement has been a historically important conduit for a range of internationalist ideas.
Second, the histories of waging peace (peace armies, civil disobedience, etc.) allow us to critically interrogate the
co-constitutive geographies of violence and nonviolence while retaining peace as a distinct category around which
to promote political engagement.
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We shy away from anything that smacks of building an ‘army’
of nonviolence, smacks of uniformity and regimentation . . .
because we are academic, over-intellectualised and conven-
tional in our attitudes, we think that making speeches about
pacifism, even superficial and dull ones, or mailing leaflets
discreetly, is necessarily virtuous (Muste, 1941).1
Introduction
In his classic essay The moral equivalent of war, the
renowned Harvard psychologist William James argued
that we have a curiously paradoxical relationship with
warfare. While intellectually we conceive of it as almost
completely negative, only permissible as a last resort,
he argued that the military commands a powerful
cultural and emotional attraction, reflected in an
unwillingness to
envisage a future in which army-life, with its many elements
of charm, shall be forever impossible, and in which the
destinies of peoples shall nevermore be decided quickly,
thrillingly, and tragically by force. (James 1911, 108)
For James, a pacifist programme that relied on
demonstrating the irrationality, horror or bloodiness of
war was wholly inadequate: the horror drove the
fascination; the more bloody the battlefield, the more
heroic the soldier. He argued that these feelings of
admiration were too deeply entrenched to be easily
abandoned without some kind of functional, psycho-
logical substitute. A genuine alternative to war there-
fore, a pacifism built for purpose, needed to not only
critique processes of war and violence but to forge a
moral equivalent to them, one that retained the
admirable elements of army character, discipline and
bravery that were so central to the military imagination.
Written at the very end of his life and prior to the
outbreak of the First World War, in many respects
James’s essay is of its time. The ‘positive martial
virtues’ that he praised sat uncomfortably alongside the
senselessness of the war that followed, one memori-
alised not by heroic statues of military fortitude but by
the unadorned grave of the Unknown Soldier. Yet
rather than diminishing James’s critique, the war also
gave its central message a renewed prescience: fuelled
by a growing sense of urgency in their calling many
pacifists, including America’s most prominent A. J.
Muste, believed that ‘essentially individualistic, moral
The information, practices and views in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of
the Royal Geographical Society (with IBG). ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2016 doi: 10.1111/tran.12145
© 2016 The Author. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal
Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers).
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
or religious pacifism . . . [was] no longer a sufficient
basis for the movement’, and that the wartime fixation
on conscientious objection, while indispensable, had
also proved vastly inadequate.2
This paper reconstructs the historical geographies of
the ‘World Peace Brigade for Nonviolent Action’, one
of the clearest attempts made to realise James’s vision.
When 55 of the world’s leading pacifists met at its
founding conference in 1961, they shared a belief, like
James, that the military offered a possible blueprint for
building a more politically influential form of pacifism
– a term defined by leading peace historian Martin
Ceadel as ‘the belief that war is always wrong and
should not be resorted to, whatever the consequences
of abstaining’ (1980, 3; original italics). Delegates
envisaged an international peace army, manned by
pacifist soldiers, who were expertly trained in nonvio-
lent direct action (e.g. strikes, boycotts, civil disobedi-
ence), and who could be deployed in any hostile
situation around the world. The Brigade forms one part
of a largely unexplored history of experimental peace
activism that ranges from Maude Royden’s Manchurian
‘peace army’ in 1931 to the efforts of the Gulf Peace
Team in 1990 (Weber 1993) and, most famously,
Mahatma Gandhi’s Shanti Sena (Sanskrit for Peace
Army), a nonviolent action force dedicated to min-
imising communal violence and promoting constructive
peace work (Weber 1996).
This tradition is driven by two beliefs exemplified in
James’s opening account. First, that there is something
intrinsically commendable in ideas of duty, service,
group discipline and courage, which are ordinarily
associated with the military. For example, Gandhi
showed a deep admiration throughout his life for the
soldier and army culture, what Maria Misra (2014) has
recently termed his ‘non-violent martiality’. Second,
that the abolition of war ultimately required pacifists to
tailor their individual moral convictions to the political
realities of national and international affairs. The
prominent American pacifist Francis Hall noted, for
example, that
If pacifism is only an individual matter, there is little hope
that it will ever have a wide influence on the practical life of
the world . . . a strong pacifist movement will come into
being only when individual pacifists will be willing to subject
their consciences, to a degree, to group discipline.3
Yet despite having undergone something of a ‘peace
turn’ in recent years, geographical scholarship has
largely and curiously overlooked the history of the
peace movement itself. I address this absence by
reconstructing the World Peace Brigade’s formative
contribution to ‘Africa Freedom Action’, a cross-
political organisation formed to support Kenneth
Kaunda and the Northern Rhodesian independence
movement in 1962. I argue that the experiences of the
Brigade in Central Africa offer geographers important
insights into how ideas of peace historically have been
circulated, adapted and even resisted. These insights
foreground the central claim of this paper: that
geography poses a distinct conceptual problem for
peace and peace movements, which have to simulta-
neously operate beyond conventional forms of territo-
rial politics while relying on the support of political
leaders and the political process for their strength,
influence and credibility. The paper shows how during
the Brigade’s time in Central Africa it developed two,
ultimately incompatible, geographical conceptions of
peace: a grounded, local one that emphasised the
strategic effectiveness of nonviolent methods for the
independence movement; and a transcendent, interna-
tionalist one couched within broader terms of world
community. In practice, this meant that the Brigade
developed a close working relationship with nationalist
movements, while continuing a self-proclaimed mission
to cure the world of what the Brigade’s chairman
termed the ‘disease of nationalism’.4 While the tension
between local practices of peace and the wider global
imagination of peace activists could be temporarily
overlooked in the heat of a short campaign, the paper
shows how it eventually disrupted pacifists’ goals in
Central Africa and prevented them from playing a
longer term, political role.
I suggest this argument has two broader implications
for peace research in geography. First, it encourages
geographers to remain attentive to the big stories of
peace and, specifically, the ways in which pacifists have
long understood their task as necessarily global in its
vision and scope. While recent scholarship has rightly
problematised ‘top-down’ accounts of peace in favour
of excavating its intimate and everyday geographies, the
case of the Brigade reminds us of how pacifism, in
understanding war as an inescapable consequence of
nationalism, has long been a historically important
conduit for a range of broadly internationalist ideas.
This perspective is exemplified by figures like Leo
Tolstoy, who argued that the pacifist conscience could
only be realised through the total abstention from
state-accredited forms of political life. Tolstoy’s con-
viction that the state was ‘the arch-enemy of humanity’
(cited in Brock 1998, 86) is a sentiment not far removed
from the Brigade’s own chairman A. J. Muste’s belief
that it was ‘the concept of the State, of national
sovereignty – which is the embodiment of evil, and the
true “enemy” of all’.5 This paper does not propose a
return to traditional peace histories of elite, global,
state and non-state institutions, but rather a closer
engagement with the way many peace activists, con-
fined to the political margins, cultivated a more organic
and nuanced sense of world community and citizenship
than is commonly accounted for. In short, a geograph-
ical perspective on peace must not only trace how the
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concept is shaped by diverse cultural and historical
contexts (as I show here), but also reconstruct the
geographical imagination of peace activists themselves
and the role this played in both enabling and con-
straining the possibilities of their activism.
Second, I suggest that closer attention to the
historical peace movement offers geographers a means
to negotiate the contradictory nature of peace research,
which, as Jenna Loyd (2015) suggests, is shaped by two
competing agendas. On the one hand, it is conceptually
motivated and seeks to destabilise the war/peace binary
to more accurately account for its relative and condi-
tional nature. As Colin Flint has suggested, geogra-
phers need to approach ‘peace and war as an
assemblage of social processes . . . seeing how the two
are intertwined manifestations of dynamic social con-
testation’ (2011, 31). On the other hand, it is politically
driven and privileges peace as a stable, strategic
category around which to classify emerging scholarship,
promote research agendas and organise political
engagement (Megoran 2011; see critique by Ross
2011). Through the case study of the Brigade, this
paper charts the parallel geographies of peace – spaces
that are not absent of conflict, but are shaped by a
pacifistic approach to it. As the prominent American
pacifist J. Holmes Smith argued:
While avoiding all that smacks of aping militarism, [pacifists]
cannot avoid certain actual parallelisms between the way of
creative conflict which is total pacifism, and the way of
destructive conflict which is total war . . . Both demand
disciplined teamwork, surrender of private interest, sacrifi-
cial devotion to the Cause.6
In mapping these ‘actual parallelisms’, I suggest that
the histories of waging peace (peace armies, civil
disobedience, sit-ins, boycotts and other forms of
nonviolent direct action) allow us to interrogate the
entangled geographies of war and peace in situated and
empirical ways. Such an approach recognises the
shared structures of struggle on which forms of violent
and nonviolent resistance are mutually constructed, yet
retains the conceptual stability of peace as a distinct
category that people have committed their lives to
pursuing.
To build this case the paper draws from a collection
of published and unpublished sources, including a
range of newspapers and magazines, first-hand
accounts by leading Brigade figures (Olson 1964; Scott
et al. 1980; Sutherland and Meyer 2000), and Kenneth
Kaunda’s own reflections (Kaunda and Morris 1980).
These are read alongside the Brigade’s unpublished
papers and those of key pacifists involved in it. What
follows is divided into four sections. The first begins by
tracing geography’s recent ‘peace turn’ and outlines the
conceptual contribution that a historical geography of
the peace movement might make. In the second part, I
examine the founding principles of the Brigade and
situate its emergence within the fast-changing political
context of Central Africa in 1962. In the third part, I
show how pacifists understood political collaboration
through a shared, counter-intuitive belief that nation-
alist movements offered the most expedient means to
dismantle nationalism. The final section charts the
rapid demise of the Brigade and shows how such a
belief was increasingly untenable as Northern Rhodesia
moved towards independence.
Toward a historical geography of peace
Notwithstanding the long and uneven engagement
geographers have had with peace and peace studies
(Bunge 1973; Pepper and Jenkins 1983 1985; Stolberg
1965; Wisner 1986), in the past several years the
discipline has undergone something of a ‘peace turn’,
reflected in the publication of three edited volumes on
the theme (Kobayashi 2011; McConnell et al. 2014;
Tyner and Inwood 2011). This has been in response to a
trio of interventions that appeared in 2011 lamenting
the asymmetry of geographical scholarship on issues of
war and peace (Inwood and Tyner 2011; Megoran 2011;
Williams and McConnell 2011). While engagement
with the former had been ‘authoritative and informed,
eloquent, theoretical and interdisciplinary’ (Megoran
2011, 178), they argued that geographers had failed to
develop a comparably sophisticated conceptual under-
standing of peace, despite often alluding to it as a goal
of their research.
In redressing this, recent scholarship has sought to
problematise peace in three key respects. First, geog-
raphers have critiqued approaches that frame peace in
dualistic terms as a stable, static or singular end-point
(e.g. that which comes after war). Instead, it has been
argued that peace is precarious and uncertain; as Woon
suggests, it is ‘fragile, contingent, and always in the
process of becoming’ (2014, 662). As such, geographers
have emphasised the impossibility of untangling the
structures of struggle and conflict that underpin violent
and nonviolent geographies, noting how peace is a
process that can only ever be partially remitted of
violent potential, broadly defined. A geographical
approach to peace must therefore account for a range
of experiences, practices and representations that are
always infused with ‘diverse repertoires of violence and
possibility’ (Darling 2014, 230; italics original).
Second, geographers have challenged representa-
tions of peace as universally formed and experienced
across time and space. Instead, there has been a
growing call across a range of disciplines to pay closer
attention to the sites and scales in which peace ‘takes
place’ (Bj€orkdahl and Buckley-Zistel 2016). Sara
Koopman (2011b), for example, has called for geogra-
phers to move away from abstract definitions in favour
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of conceptualising peace as a socio-spatial relation, one
that is permanently being made and unmade relative to
its historical and geographical contexts. As she writes,
‘peace means different things at different scales, as well
as to different groups and at different times and places’,
i.e. peace has a history and a geography (Koopman
2014, 111).
Third, geographers have questioned accounts of
peace that position it beyond, after, above or without
politics. Placing peace necessarily foregrounds the role
of power in shaping what peace is and who it is for. The
work of Fiona McConnell (2014) and Philippa Williams
(2013 2015) has demonstrated how shifting conceptions
of peace (real or imagined) structured how a range of
competing interests were promoted and how patterns
of difference and marginality were sustained. Geogra-
phers have shown how NGOs, peace industry profes-
sionals and state elites reproduce discourses of ‘liberal
peace’ associated with free market economics and
democratisation that can themselves perpetuate struc-
tures of inequality and corruption (Le Billon 2008) and,
as Patricia Daley (2006 2014) has shown of Central
Africa specifically, work against local practices and
understandings of the concept. The challenge facing
geographers therefore is to account for both the
problematic dimensions of peace as well as its gener-
ative possibilities. In short, by re-examining peace in
these three ways there has been a broad consensus of
the need to dislodge fixed, ageographical or apolitical
accounts of peace and reconceptualise it instead as a
spatially constituted and politically contested process
(Loyd 2012).
In undertaking this task, geographers have been
encouraged to pay closer attention to how peace-
makers themselves have defined and used the concept
(Koopman 2011b; Williams et al. 2014). Koopman’s
(2011a 2014) work on international protective accom-
paniment in Colombia sits beside a wider range of
geographical writing on the contemporary enactment of
peace movements that sets about this task (e.g. Miller
1994 2000; Oslender 2008). Yet the history of the peace
movement – its institutions, individuals and ideas –
remain curiously overlooked by geographers (excluding
Herb 2005).
There are at least two reasons why this should
concern us. First, the large body of literature outside of
geography on the historical peace movement pays
insufficient attention to its distinctive geographical
traditions, or spatial and scalar dynamics. Instead a
premium is placed on developing typologies of pacifism
(Brock and Young 1999) and nonviolent practice
(Sharp 1973) that are differentiated by either ethical
derivation (e.g. anarchism, humanism, religion) or by
varying degrees of commitment (e.g. the distinction
between a consequentialist view that emphasises paci-
fism’s preferable practical outcomes, and a
deontological perspective that sees violence as univer-
sally and morally wrong). Such distinctions are impor-
tant (both within the rest of this essay and beyond) and
illustrate how terms like pacifism are highly contested,
taking on a variety of meanings and connotations as
they travel. Yet besides a hardy core of believers, many
activists and those with whom they worked (including
Kaunda, as we shall see) moved between these
categories in problematic ways. Similarly, by focusing
on discrete national traditions (e.g. Brock 1968; Ceadel
1980; Chatfield 1971) or some comparative perspective
between them (e.g. Zunes et al. 1999), these accounts
are ill-equipped to examine how operationally transna-
tional organisations, like the Brigade, consciously
traversed borders in ways suggestive of their anti-statist
politics.
Second, within geography, emphasis has been placed
on routine ‘moments of cooperation and coexistence,
exchange and encounter’ in order to address questions
of peace, violence and agency within the micro-politics
of daily life (Williams and McConnell 2011, 928). This
has rightly prioritised the oft-overlooked ‘intimate’
(Brickell 2015), ‘everyday’ (Williams 2013 2015) or
‘peopled’ (Woon 2015) geographies of peace. Yet these
studies ‘from below’ can become unhelpfully posi-
tioned, implicitly or otherwise, against traditional
international accounts of ‘liberal’ peace framed by the
terms of policymaking elites and peace professionals,
housed in a range of prestigious, international agencies.
This does a disservice to how many activists, resigned to
the counter-cultural margins, had a more nuanced
sense of internationalism and international organising
in mind.
For centuries, philosophers and reformers of all
creeds have shared a belief that peace would necessar-
ily accompany new forms of world consciousness and
international governance. The peace historian Lawr-
ence Wittner wrote, for example, that when ‘Americans
dreamed of a world without war, the vision shimmered
hazily before them of the restoration of the human
community’ (1969, 4). Yet, as David Cortright (2008)
suggests, the terminology of internationalism and
pacifism is too imprecise and obfuscates the diverse
political traditions (ranging from the conservative to
the radical) that underpin these global visions of peace.
There is a broad historical division, for example,
between those who accepted the legitimacy of the
nation-state and those who did not. The former
included large organisations and peace industry pro-
fessionals who were tightly associated with corporate
and governmental life. The latter group, led by more
radical pacifists (including the Brigade’s members),
were cautious of state-centric conceptions of interna-
tional law, or a legal machinery of institutions necessary
to enforce it, in favour of fostering a more organic
sense of world community and internationalism ‘from
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below’ (Herman et al. 1973). This perspective was
characteristically anti-nationalistic, believing national
sovereignty to be indivisible from its capacity to
exercise violence (Atack 2012), reflected in a tradition
that has long pioneered pacifist forms of radical
decentralisation (e.g. ashrams, communes, co-ops,
collectives, cells) that challenged the normative role
of the nation-state as the basic political unit of
organisation (e.g. Ostergaard 1982).
This paper encourages geographers to remain
attentive to the important, complex and contradictory
role that the peace movement has played in shaping the
historical geographies of internationalism in the twen-
tieth century (Hodder 2015; Hodder et al. 2015). When
the Brigade chairman A. J. Muste talks of the ‘world
task of pacifism’ and the urgent need to stop approach-
ing peace ‘with a narrow and provincial vision and on a
petty scale’, for example, he means something quite
different from the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace’s sense of its global mission.7 Centring
these contested international histories of peace offers
new insights into the role that geographical ideas have
played in shaping the contours of peace activism as well
as the possibilities of adapting pacifism for a diverse
range of political contexts. While in one sense this
allows us to destabilise ideas of peace, showing its
fluidity and amenability as it moves, it nonetheless
holds our focus on the always material realities of those
engaged in peace activism. Such an approach is
critically supportive of a research agenda in geography
that underscores the potential of rethinking the disci-
pline in more inclusive and peaceful terms, whether
through the lens of ‘pacific’ (Megoran 2008 2010),
‘subaltern’ (Sharp 2011) or ‘alter-’ (Koopman 2011a)
geopolitics. In the rest of this paper, I use the case of
the World Peace Brigade in Central Africa to explore
the benefits of examining the historical peace move-
ment from a geographical perspective.
Northern Rhodesia, 1962
At the end of December 1961, fifty-five leading
pacifists met at the Brigade’s founding conference in
Lebanon, charged with implementing the decision of
the Tenth Triennial Conference of the War Resisters’
International to establish an independent, highly
trained cadre of international pacifists skilled in emer-
gency peace-making. They envisioned the Brigade as a
‘sort of “fighting arm” of the world peace movement’,
infused with army-style organisation, strategy and
discipline.8 Pacifist soldiers might ‘capture some of
the drama of daring and glamorous exploits which are
now monopolized by the military’, the prominent
American pacifist Robert Swann noted, ‘The publicity
value is obvious, and we might reap great psychological
strength by practicing nonviolent “war games”.’9
Britain’s Guardian newspaper reported how the new
Brigade’s strength derived from its international group
of ‘non-political’ activists, unattached to the ambitions
of individual governments or states.10 As the leading
peace scholars Johan Galtung and Richard Gregg told
the conference, pacifists were uniquely placed to
articulate a broader, impartial moral conscience on
international affairs, one reflective of the ‘ultimate
unity of life’.11 This global perspective was woven
through the Brigade’s operational structure. The
organisation had three regional councils that, in turn,
reported to a world council: Asia, chaired by the Indian
independence activist Jayaprakash Narayan and oper-
ating out of Varanasi; Europe, chaired by Rev. Michael
Scott, the renowned British anti-apartheid activist, and
based in the Peace Pledge Union’s offices in London;
and North America, run by A. J. Muste out of the New
York offices of the American Friends Service Commit-
tee.12 The Brigade’s constitution centred on the
importance of its ‘one world’ vision: ‘World Community
can replace the institution of war’ and its principles
were based on
(i) the acceptance of the underlying unity of all men . . . (ii)
the acceptance of the principle of non-violence and the use
of methods consistent with those principles to achieve world
community.13
In recruiting an army of world citizens, the Brigade’s
volunteers would become what Abbe Pierre nobly
called, ‘the nonviolent defenders of man’.14
Yet precisely how ‘non-political’ the Brigade would
be was a point of contention. While some hoped for the
Brigade to be an impartial conciliator, more radically
minded delegates argued that there was an immediate
strategic need to ‘take sides’ on the issue of colonialism.
They suggested that the Brigade’s originality relied on
its ability to locally adapt pacifism into a resistance tool
for those otherwise consigned to either ongoing injus-
tice or violent overthrow.15 The African American
pacifist Bill Sutherland told delegates that it was
academic to speak of consensual goals when considering the
policies of South African or Angolan governments, the
status quo is a condition of static violence . . . [and] creative
conflict may be necessary to bring about true peace.16
When the conference closed at the start of 1962,
therefore, little seemed more fitting to the Brigade’s
founding principles than the evolving political situation
in Northern Rhodesia. The country’s independence
struggle, led by Kenneth Kaunda and the United
National Independence Party (UNIP), sought to cap-
italise on the rapid gains made by anti-colonial move-
ments across Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s
(see Figure 1). Seventeen African nations had achieved
independence in 1960 alone, including the neighbour-
ing Republic of the Congo, where Belgian rule had
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been notoriously restrictive. Even within the paternal-
istic logic of colonialism, few seriously believed that the
states of British Central Africa were less capable of
self-government. Neighbouring Tanganyika (later Tan-
zania), a close political ally, had also become indepen-
dent in December 1961, less than a month before the
Brigade’s founding.
Yet the forms of colonialism that remained (includ-
ing Northern and Southern Rhodesia) were more
recalcitrant, more entrenched and more willing to
violently defend the status quo. This reflected the
different political arrangement of settler colonialism,
where a permanently based white minority economi-
cally, socially and politically dominated the numerically
larger African population. Northern Rhodesia was a
member of the Central African Federation (CAF),
which consisted of three British territories: the protec-
torates of Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia) and
Nyasaland (later Malawi), and the self-governing
colony of Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe).
Though by virtue of its vast copper mines Northern
Rhodesia was technically the wealthiest member state,
it was Southern Rhodesia, with a white settler popu-
lation almost three times larger, that was the dominant
territory in CAF.
When the Brigade was founded at the start of 1962,
British withdrawal from the region seemed likely, but
there was uncertainty over what shape independence
would take. One side, represented by CAF’s Prime
Minister, the white Southern Rhodesian Roy Welensky,
Figure 1 Africa administrative divisions, 1 January 1962
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 196217
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campaigned to retain the federation post-independence.
Conjoining the Rhodesias would combine the copper
wealth of the north with the industrial capacity of the
south, forming a large and prosperous white minority
that could comfortably govern across the region. The
other side, represented byKaunda andUNIP, demanded
that the British government grant all three territories a
separate, democratic constitution based on cross-racial
suffrage. Kaunda believed the British government, keen
to remove itself from the equation, would bend to
Welensky’s federalist campaigning without sufficient
counter-pressure. He set about mobilising a mass,
nonviolent campaign, announcing in the copper belt
that he had a grand master-plan that could cripple the
prized extraction industries and called on Northern
Rhodesians to sabotage key government infrastructure.
These mounting tensions had made the country a global
focal point of anti-colonial unrest at the start of 1962 (see
Hatch 1976).
Consequently, Northern Rhodesia had an obvious
and timely appeal as the Brigade’s inaugural project. In
Kaunda, pacifists had a natural political ally. No other
African leader had reflected so passionately and so
publicly on the importance of nonviolence. Unlike
others, like Julius Nyerere in neighbouring Tanganyika,
who were nonviolent in practice but held no philo-
sophical opposition to violence, Kaunda was a self-
professed Gandhian disciple who had spent several
months in India in 1958, and later wrote that the Indian
leader’s ‘teachings flooded my mind with light’
(Kaunda and Morris 1980, 16). His strategy was also
inspired by the ‘positive action’ campaigns of Ghana’s
Kwame Nkrumah, with whom many of the Brigade’s
key figures had experience working alongside. Michael
Scott, A. J. Muste, Michael Randle, Bill Sutherland,
Bayard Rustin and E. C. Quay, the Mayor of Accra, all
came to the World Peace Brigade conference fresh
from organising a march with Nkrumah to obstruct
French nuclear testing in the Sahara (see Allman 2008;
Skinner 2015). Yet pacifists had since become margin-
alised in West Africa and, with the situation in
Northern Rhodesia more immediately amenable to
their influence, they were keen to make one more
decisive case for nonviolence on the continent. Peace
News told its readers that the outcome would ‘set a
pattern for internal non-violent revolution backed by
international direct action or the final defeat of non-
violence as a serious idea in power politics’.18
Pacifist collaboration also brought distinct benefits
for Kaunda. The British government had no clear
stance on the shape of independence in Northern
Rhodesia, yet in the wake of Harold Macmillan’s
famous 1960 ‘wind of change’ speech it was clear that
the British appetite for colonialism had much dimin-
ished. The Brigade’s support strengthened Kaunda’s
claim to hold a credible master-plan that could
economically and politically cripple the country. If
Kaunda’s strategy was to devise ‘an amalgam of
Gandhi’s non-violence and Nkrumah’s positive action’,
the Brigade, whose members had experience working
alongside both figures, offered a unique way for doing
so (Hatch 1976, 161).
Moreover, international opinion was increasingly
shaping events. In 1957, when Kaunda attended the
Commonwealth Conference in London, besides a few
days spent in Southern Rhodesia and Tanganyika, it
was his first experience of foreign travel (Hatch 1976).
The visit marked a distinct shift, following which
independence was increasingly placed in a continental
and international context. Throughout the early 1960s,
Kaunda tirelessly built his international profile. His
several visits to Washington during this period estab-
lished him as the key political figure in Central Africa.
In the eyes of foreign officials, his non-threatening
reputation as a ‘gentle, ascetic’ character committed to
a ‘path of moderation and non-violence’ (Larmer 2011,
46–7) helped steer the independence movement
through the increasingly polarised world of the Cold
War. The Brigade reinforced this ‘peaceful’ reputation
and connected Kaunda to unofficial, international
support groups like the American Committee on
Africa, which organised and funded his US visits
(Nesbitt 2004). In so doing, pacifists allowed Kaunda
to build international pressure in a way that, however
crudely or briefly, transcended Cold War geopolitical
channels – a strategy he would refine post-indepen-
dence as a leader in the non-aligned movement, hosting
their summit in Lusaka in 1970 and serving as its
chairman from 1970 to 1973.
It is important, however, not to over-emphasise the
role of the Cold War here. As Sue Onslow (2009) has
written, although international pressure was a signifi-
cant determinant of independence, local actors them-
selves did not see the Washington/Moscow axis as
singularly important (see also Onslow 2015). The
immediate goal of decolonisation was the dominant
driving force of political change on the continent. As a
special issue of The International History Review
(Schaufelbuehl et al. 2015) has recently suggested, we
need to avoid ascribing the Cold War an omnipotent
presence that undermines the agency and dynamism of
independence movements to navigate a path that was,
as Gerard McCann writes, ‘in the Cold War, but not of
it’ (2013, 260). In this spirit, I now turn to consider how
the Brigade negotiated its founding global vision of
peace, with the local political role it sought to play in
Northern Rhodesia.
‘We are not betraying our internationalism’
The Brigade’s influence in Central Africa was the result
of a delicate geographical balancing act, one that both
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capitalised on the political support offered by nation-
alist leaders while situating it within a broader anti-
nationalistic vision of peace through world community.
After its founding conference closed, the Brigade was
invited to observe the Addis Ababa meeting of the Pan-
African Freedom Movement of East and Central
Africa (PAFMECA) in February 1962. There the
Brigade’s representatives spent several days with both
Kaunda (then president of PAFMECA) and Julius
Nyerere (head of Tanganyika’s leading political party
Tanganyika African National Union [TANU]), who
were both keen for a nonviolent training centre to be
established in Tanganyika’s capital Dar es Salaam and,
in the case of Nyerere, offered the government support
necessary to do so. The centre would train local and
foreign activists in nonviolent direct action, as well as
form a base from which to organise the second, more
dramatic, part of their work: an immediate march from
Dar es Salaam to Northern Rhodesia’s capital Lusaka.
Kaunda and Nyerere were keen for the march to follow
similar lines to the earlier Sahara protest and offered
the resources of UNIP, TANU and PAFMECA to
secure mass participation. The march would draw
international attention to Kaunda’s wider campaign for
a six-month general strike. Writing in Tanganyika’s
largest English-language newspaper The Standard,
Kaunda called on Northern Rhodesians to prepare
for the strike, the start of which would be marked by
the ‘invasion’ of ‘thousands and thousands of volun-
teers of the World Peace Brigade’.19
The Brigade’s quick ascension to power reflected
its willingness to develop a close collaboration with
political leaders, especially between its key represen-
tatives (Michael Scott, Bayard Rustin, Bill Suther-
land), Kaunda and Nyerere. Together they undertook
a series of rallies and spoke before enthusiastic
crowds of four to five thousand in Dar es Salaam and
eight to ten thousand in Mbeya, drawn by the chance
to meet the independence ‘stars’. Nyerere and Scott
co-chaired fund-raising appeals that involved, in one
example, holding a party at Nyerere’s home for
wealthy donors, and a national concert event in
another.20 Nyerere also gave the Brigade provision of
a house in Dar es Salaam (a former prime ministerial
residence), an office and cars, as well as government
property for the training centre. This support
reflected the international attention that the Bri-
gade’s work was attracting. In the USA, they were
featured in the New York Times, New York Post and
The Nation, as well as The Times and The Guardian
in Britain.21 Yet it was also a collaboration that was
closer than many in the West were publicly aware:
‘Who can measure what it has meant that our house
has had an open door for UNIP . . . [or the] money
we have given them’, Sutherland noted in personal
correspondence,
That we have on several occasions paid UNIP’s office rent
before the money came rolling in, gave money to the chief
representative when he was ill – things one just can’t put out
in newsletters or hold press conferences about?22
This political collaboration may appear unremark-
able; if violence is both morally wrong and endemic in
colonialism, it is unsurprising that pacifists should side
with anti-colonial movements. Yet this undervalues the
novelty of the Brigade’s approach, which marked a
decisive break from traditional pacifist work in Africa
that had long been associated with missionaries, colo-
nial government officials and white commercial inter-
ests. In the past, A. J. Muste argued, pacifists had been
betrayed into thinking of themselves as some kind of middle
ground between [these] elements and the movements of
dissent and revolt among the Africans. Actually, where basic
issues are involved there is no such middle ground.23
Likewise, contemporaneous peace projects in North-
ern Rhodesia overwhelmingly emphasised grassroots
development – building schools, housing and infras-
tructure – rather than bigger independence goals or
political collaboration. This included the ‘practical
idealism’ programme of the American Friends Service
Committee, which constituted the largest delegation at
the World Peace Brigade conference.24 Political col-
laboration challenged a broader consensus that paci-
fists’ strength derived from the consistency of their
moral position, which, by refusing to take sides, allowed
them to transcend conflict and build the foundations
for reconciliation.
In seeking to furnish liberation movements with
nonviolent methods, the Brigade sought to transpose
and adapt pacifism therefore to the fast-changing
political context in Central Africa in a way that could
appeal to those at all scales of moral or pacifistic
commitment. This was what the Brigade termed
‘peacekeeping with its sleeves rolled up’.25 It is what
we might term, however, a parallel geography of peace,
one that sought to find ‘equivalent outlets for the war-
producing drives’, as Aldous Huxley put to the Brigade,
rather than challenging the basic framework of inter-
vention that militarism rested on.26 This approach was
built on an assessment of the mutual constitution of
violent and nonviolent forms of struggle. As Thomas C.
Schelling wrote in the introduction to Gene Sharp’s
three-volume classic The Politics of Nonviolent Action:
Discipline, command and control; intelligence about the
adversary; careful choice of weapons, targets, terrain, time
of day; and, especially, avoiding impetuous recourse to
provoked or purposeless violence . . . Most of what are
usually called the ‘principals of war’ . . . are about as
appropriate to the study of nonviolent action as to the
violent. (1973, xii)
As such, the Brigade reproduced many of the
cultural and gendered assumptions of the military.
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Rather than challenge the idea of the soldier as a
symbol of masculinity, for example, they sought to
capitalise on it (e.g. Woodward and Winter 2007). As
Marian Mollin (2006, 182) has shown, these dramatic
and radical forms of pacifism often relied on the
insertion of mainstream paradigms of post-war man-
hood that allowed activists to cast themselves in
familiar and respectable roles, and thereby underval-
ued the decisive contribution of women to the move-
ment. The male-only draft had meant that pacifist
women had been excluded from wartime imprison-
ment, where their male counterparts had carved out
alternative notions of heroism and militancy which the
Brigade, to some extent, was a continuation of.
By formally folding the Brigade’s Africa project into
a cross-organisational body called Africa Freedom
Action (AFA), jointly run by the Brigade, UNIP, TANU
and PAFMECA, they sought to minimise some of the
potentially problematic issues that arose from pacifist
‘outsiders’ playing an increasingly significant role in an
African liberation struggle. AFA’s wording was accord-
ingly delicate:
Africa Freedom Action is an international movement
sponsored and led by Africans to secure the liberation of
Africa from colonialism. It came into existence in response
to a growing need to give organised expression to the
international support which Africans have in their struggle to
emancipate themselves from foreign rule and all forms of
racial discrimination against them in their own country.27
Like inWestAfricapreviously, theBrigade recognised
that collaboration with local political leaders helped to,
as Michael Scott put it, ‘take the racial edge off’ (Scott
et al. 1980, 135). A concern reflected in the Brigade’s
choice of representatives, which included two African
Americans (Bayard Rustin and Bill Sutherland), an
Indian (Suresh Ram) andMichael Scott, one of themost
prominent white pro-African activists of his generation.
While the Brigade relied on these political alliances
for their relevance, they keenly emphasised their more
expansive global vision of peace. It was argued that by
supporting African nationalism in the first instance, the
Brigade could ultimately broaden aspirations beyond
independence. This was based on a strategic calculation
that the dynamics of nationalism continued to play an
important role in mobilising social change, while their
own, personal belief in the primacy of world community
was either ignored or viewed with suspicion. Thus, the
uniqueness of the Brigade’s contribution would be
determined by its ability to practically support indepen-
dence movements while also retaining the longer term
goal of reshaping nationalist energies into internation-
alist ones. The head of the Belgian branch of the War
Resisters’ International, Jean van Lierde, argued that:
When we speak of ‘collaboration’ to the nationalist parties,
we are not betraying our internationalism, but simply
realising at what stage of liberation from imperialism the
colonies are. This stage holds at one and the same time the
possibility of quenching elementary, brutal reactions of
tribalism and internal ethnic conflicts (these being forms of
micro-nationalisms) and of superseding these nationalisms
by integrating them into pan-Africanism and directing them
towards universalism . . . Thus pacifism must exert its
influence on diverse political currents. It must remain
unshakable in its radical witness against war and violence,
but it must stay sufficiently flexible in the political field.28
AFA was the embodiment of this political flexibility.
It was, Michael Scott asserted, ‘more than an African
nationalist movement, yet draws its strength and
inspiration from it’.29 While the Brigade sought to
‘loyally serve’ political parties and their allies, they also
stressed a healthy separation.30 By couching interven-
tion in terms of peace, Kaunda, like Gandhi before
him, was not positioned as a nationalist but as a pioneer
of nonviolence who, as the Brigade’s statement to the
UN noted, was ‘in the true sense a leader of humanity,
a leader of people of all races who want to find
peaceful and orderly means of advance’.31 This was not
unique to the Brigade; many contemporary observers
admired Kaunda’s deep personal commitment to ‘non-
racialism’ (Hatch 1976, xiv). Through Kaunda’s self-
titled philosophy of ‘humanism’, the Brigade was able
to imaginatively square its self-professed goal of world
citizenship within the narrower political role it was
playing alongside nationalist movements. Though not
an ideal arrangement, this compromise seemed ‘prac-
tical and necessary’, as one returning Brigade volunteer
put it, and reflected the ability of pacifism to be
adapted to local political circumstances.32 Yet, as I now
turn to show, as the need for a march diminished, these
divergent conceptions of peace were ultimately incom-
patible and prevented the Brigade from playing a
longer term political role.
New beginnings and ends
At the end of February 1962, under pressure from
further political unrest, London offered an amended
constitution with provisions for greater African repre-
sentation. With votes for less than one-twelfth of the
adult African population, it was some way short of the
much-heralded ‘one man, one vote’, but it was even-
tually decided to postpone the march and to contest the
elections under these new terms. Northern Rhodesians
went to the polls at the end of October 1962 to vote in
what Time magazine called ‘the election that nobody
won’.33 While the British government’s noncommittal
stance had produced an effectively unworkable consti-
tution, it had also prevented the white United Federal
Party from re-forming a government and the general
strike and march were officially cancelled. On 31
December 1963, the Central African Federation was
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formally dissolved, and shortly following the protec-
torates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became
the independent Republic of Zambia (with Kaunda
serving as its president until 1991) and the common-
wealth realm of Malawi. Southern Rhodesia had a
more chequered history. It initially remained a British
colony before its white-minority government unilater-
ally declared independence in 1965 and a protracted
15-year civil war followed, the eventual outcome of
which was independence in 1980 as the Republic of
Zimbabwe.
As Kaunda turned to constitutional routes, the
influence of pacifists dwindled in Northern Rhodesia.
Accustomed to the political margins, they had little
experience or appetite for electioneering and the
postponement of the march before the election, and
cancellation following it, made their role as organisers
and strategists increasingly marginal. Recognising this
situation, the Brigade sought to refocus its activities
further south to those areas still under the yoke of
colonial or minority rule. Leaders elsewhere were less
receptive, however. In conversations between Suther-
land and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, for
example, it was clear that they believed nonviolence to
no longer be a viable option.34 As Muste noted, unlike
Kaunda, they
do not have any appreciable faith in nonviolence as a
philosophy or in the abstract . . . [and] we in turn have not so
far been able to come up with concrete ideas for nonviolent
intervention.35
Even Kaunda’s commitment to nonviolence was
under strain, however. As minority rule entrenched in
southern Africa, there was growing pressure on him,
from groups like the Organisation for African Unity, to
support neighbouring countries to independence by
‘any means’, and even figures in his own party
questioned his friendly acquaintance with foreign
pacifists.36 Kaunda publicly distanced himself from
pacifists at the same moment that stories began
circulating which characterised the Brigade as an
‘imperialist peace corps’.37 In the wake of indepen-
dence, the Cold War increasingly coloured the suspi-
cion with which African leaders viewed all shades of
international support. Nkrumah had also threatened to
evict American Peace Corps for spying in Ghana in
1962, for example (Deroche 2009). Without political
backing (either within or without Northern Rhodesia),
the Brigade’s presence was untenable and it was agreed
that it would close down operations by March 1963.
The Brigade’s rapid rise and fall in Central Africa
over the course of 12 months reflected the very real
practical challenges of operationalising a ‘moral equiv-
alent of war’. The scheme was wildly expensive and
always at odds with the peace movement’s capacity to
pay for it. The Brigade was never financially
independent, and by October 1962 it barely had the
money for a phone line. Likewise, the ambition of
building a mobile army of non-violent soldiers ignored
any number of logistical challenges. Guidelines for
volunteers to ‘dispose of their affairs in such a way as to
be ready on call’, including, at the minimum, securing
passports, visas and inoculation, was a prohibitively
high and unrealistic commitment.38
It is important to neither overlook nor underesti-
mate these practical difficulties, yet it is the contention
of this paper that there was a deeper, conceptual
inconsistency that disrupted the goals of the Brigade in
Central Africa, rooted in the tension between its local
adaptations and its global representations of pacifism
as a political project. While supporting nationalist
leaders ‘on the ground’, they nonetheless retained the
belief that peace was ultimately dependent on the
unifying power of world community beyond the nation-
state. Geography poses a broader conceptual problem
therefore for peace and peace movements. If, as many
pacifists believed, violence was constitutive of nation-
hood (or any other sub-global unit that divided the
‘human community’), the support of post-colonial
nationalism was a clear conflict of interest. As the
anarcho-pacifist Paul Goodman wrote, there
might be some shadow of a reason for the transient existence
of the new sovereignties of Africa and Asia in their
emergence from colonialism, but on the whole this imitative
evolution is an absurdity.39
The Brigade’s characterisation that nationalism was
a necessary stage to world community – ‘a transient
existence’ – worked only temporarily to gloss over how
incompatible the support of anti-colonial nationalism
was with their global vision of peace. In the longer
term, there was no real sense of how pacifists could
operate alongside newly independent states. Not least,
because independence represented an enormous
achievement for African leaders and, by denying this,
pacifists undermined the relationship on which their
position ultimately relied. Moreover, the direct action
techniques that the Brigade offered as a peaceful
alternative to violent insurrection derived their strength
from the ability to undermine or disobey a state’s
authority and thereby challenge its broader claim to
legitimacy. While this obstructionist repertoire may
have appealed to nationalist leaders in the heat of
battle against an oppressive colonial state, it did not
when they were trying to consolidate power as heads of
newly independent ones. Post-independence, anti-
colonialism ceased to be the driving force in the region
and pacifists were ill-suited for its replacement with
state-building, which lacked a comparable moral clarity
for them.
As independence loomed, Sutherland recalled
Kaunda turning to him at a rally and stating that while
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he had supported the Brigade until then, he had chosen
to be a politician and to enter government (Sutherland
and Meyer 2000). What Kaunda meant by this was later
explored in his 1980 collection of essays Kaunda on
violence, published as The riddle of violence in the USA.
‘A thoroughgoing pacifism’, he wrote, ‘encourages
blanket judgments about political regimes, ruling out
the marginal moral distinctions that are the raw stuff of
statesmanship’ (Kaunda and Morris 1980, 60). In these
essays, Kaunda’s critique of pacifism rested not on its
impracticality per se, but on the impossibility to exist
perpetually in opposition to the state – and he believed
no state could survive without the exercise of force,
even if only limited and judicial. As Julius Nyerere later
reflected, ‘Once you’ve accepted the nation-state, you
accept the consequences – including armies, including
security services bureaucracy, police, and the lot’
(Sutherland and Meyer 2000, 87). Kaunda’s declaration
to Sutherland at the rally was, in effect, a declaration
on the intractability of statehood with a pacifist
geographical tradition that had long prioritised the
replacement of nationhood with new global forms of
loyalty and affiliation. As a politician, he argued that he
was now beholden to those who elected him, rather
than his conscience, and therefore he required ‘the
freedom to discriminate’. ‘I know that word sounds like
a fall from grace into the grey areas of political
morality’, he wrote; ‘Alas, much of my life is spent in
these murky waters’ (Kaunda and Morris 1980, 89;
original italics).
Pacifists in the West were equally critical of the
Brigade’s work. ‘There are risks involved when one
enters the real world of action and politics’, the
volunteer Ed Lazar noted, but what was needed was
‘a full and open airing before the peace movement’.40
Pacifists were suspicious of the Brigade’s secrecy and
they had little faith that its work in Central Africa was
separate from government at all. Lyle Tatum of the
American Friends Service Committee suggested
that there is a heady wine of high places about WPB [World
Peace Brigade] that needs watching – UN testimony, prime
ministers as friends and patrons, etc. . . . Rather than a
positive force the WPB became sort of a secret weapon in a
cold war.41
Even the Brigade’s own representatives recognised
that structuring the organisation’s work within the
AFA’s tetrad of political parties inevitably ‘made it
impossible for the democratic and open approach most
pacifists are used to’.42
Sutherland later wrote that African leaders, while
challenging the violence of colonialism, had failed to
challenge the deeper violent structures of nationalism
(Sutherland and Meyer 2000). Accordingly, pacifists
struggled to consolidate their position in the post-
independence period; this is true of the World Peace
Brigade in Central Africa, but it is also true of the
earlier Sahara protest in Ghana, of South Africa or of
Gandhi’s heirs in India. In hindsight, convincing
emerging leaders to surrender their hard-won indepen-
dence in favour of ‘a hypothetical, tenuous, inade-
quately financed nonviolence program’ was an
impossible task, and pacifists were instinctively uncom-
fortable with nation-building.43 For many of those
involved, the Brigade demonstrated a basic incapacity
for pacifism to penetrate political practice in any kind
of enduring way. As Sutherland wrote, ‘I just can’t find
room in modern statehood for basic nonviolence’ (cited
in Danielson 2014, 295).
Conclusion: an expensive experiment of
failure?
It is often difficult to assess peace activism within
conventional terms of success or failure, and the
Brigade was necessarily experimental in its nature.
Yet despite this, many pacifists were unapologetic in
their criticism. Devi Prasad, the then General Secretary
of the War Resisters’ International, wrote that ‘It was
sheer good luck for the organisers that the project had
to be given up, otherwise it would have proved the
greatest flop in the modern history of non-violence’
(1964, 2). Likewise, Anton Nelson, a founding confer-
ence delegate, argued that there was ‘nothing to gain by
not confessing that the AFA project was an expensive
experiment of failure’.44 The greatest failure, they
suggested, was to reinforce the common suspicion of
emerging African leaders that nonviolence was good in
theory but unable to meet the tough demands of
political action. Even Kaunda, who had been more
publicly and vocally committed to nonviolence than any
other African leader, found it increasingly untenable,
noting that the ‘business of statecraft is enough to sober
the keenest idealist’ (Kaunda and Morris 1980, 37).
This paper has drawn on the story of the World
Peace Brigade’s rapid rise and fall in Central Africa in
order to reflect on the broader conceptual problem that
geography poses for peace and peace movements – a
problem that is partly reflected in these assessments.
While on the one hand pacifists commonly believed
that peace necessitated a wholesale reorganisation of
political life (ordinarily expressed within terms of world
community and human brotherhood), their ability to
realistically articulate this as a political alternative
depended on their closeness to nationalist leaders who,
in part, drew their strength and credibility from the very
same political system that pacifists openly denounced.
The Brigade reminds us therefore of the remarkable,
and often overlooked, access that pacifists had to anti-
colonial leaders during the twilight of empire. Many
pacifists saw decolonisation as a unique historical
opportunity to reconcile their moral principles with
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their political ambition, and the Brigade’s brief history
in Central Africa is a testament to this. Accustomed to
life on the political margins, peace activists were
disorientated by their sudden proximity to government,
having just weeks or months earlier been working
alongside insurgent movements like their own. They
attached an uncharacteristic optimism to the prospects
of decolonisation, a process they almost universally
read as a struggle against imperialism, rather than one
for nationalism. Championing the anti-colonial cause,
they believed, offered the chance to contest state-
centric conceptions of peace shaped by the imperatives
of security, law and order, yet their success ultimately
brought into being new states, with new security
agendas. This optimism therefore, even within the
space of a few years, looked to be tragically misplaced
and they were later criticised for getting distracted by
such political manoeuvres. As the British pacifist
Michael Randle reflected, while government collabo-
ration was enabling in very real ways, it also presented a
series of ‘dangers and temptations not all of which we
dealt with successfully’.45
In light of the relative absence of geographical
scholarship on the history of the peace movement, the
case study presented here has two broader implications
for peace research in the discipline. First, it encourages
geographers to remain attentive to the big stories of
peace in a way that seriously engages with how pacifists
understood their own historical project as one that was
unapologetically global in its scope and ambition. As
much as a moral or intellectual enterprise, therefore,
pacifism was also a fundamentally geographical one.
Woven into it was a distinctly internationalist concep-
tion of peace, which necessitated the founding of
operationally transnational organisations like the Bri-
gade that were unaffiliated with individual nation-
states and that could form a new basis for a world
community. In short, in the eyes of many peace activists
the struggle for a world without war was inexorably
entwined with the struggle for a world without borders.
This paper has demonstrated how this internationalist
spirit both shaped the organisation of the peace
movement and yet limited its political possibilities. It
is important therefore that scholarship not only
considers peace contextually, but also that it meaning-
fully engages with the rich geographical tradition of
those who dedicated their lives to using, understanding
and campaigning for it. In attending to the pacifist
world-view, the paper does not seek to discredit or
critique recent scholarship that has rightly re-examined
peace as experienced and understood ‘from below’, but
it does caution against ascribing any simple political
dichotomy onto this. From the political margins, these
activists developed a nuanced sense of internationalism
and international organising that bore little relation to
the well-financed governmental and non-governmental
agencies that are commonly associated with global
accounts of peace.
Second, the case of the Brigade highlights the
parallel geographies of peace; the desire to forge a
moral equivalent of war was not the result of an
absence of struggle and conflict, but a pacifistic
approach to them. As the radical peace activist Jim
Peck told the New York Times, ‘We are like the
munitions makers, we boom in war and slump in
peace’ (Kaufman 1973, 30). I suggest that engaging
with these histories allows geographers to negotiate the
contradictory nature of peace research, which is shaped
by two competing agendas. The first is conceptually
driven and seeks to theoretically destabilise peace to
more accurately account for its fragile, precarious and
relative nature. The second is politically motivated and
privileges peace as a singular, stable, strategic category
around which to label scholarship, promote research
agendas and mobilise a movement. It is the contention
of this paper that waging peace (whether in the form of
peace armies, sit-ins, boycotts, marches, civil disobedi-
ence, nonviolent direct action) allows scholars to
excavate the common structures of struggle that co-
produce both violent and nonviolent forms of resis-
tance. War and peace geographies therefore co-exist in
entangled and mutually reinforcing ways – the pacifists
who formed the Brigade did not envisage the end of
conflict: they believed all societies were a balance
between coercion and consent. Rather they sought its
‘reduction, management and transformation within a
framework that precludes the violent use of force’.46 By
approaching these arguments materially and empiri-
cally through the histories of the peace movement
itself, geographers can critically examine how ideas of
peace are circulated, adapted and even resisted, while
nonetheless retaining the conceptual stability of peace
as a distinct category around which to organise and
promote more peaceful futures.
In this spirit, despite pacifists’ frank criticism, the
Brigade ultimately leaves us a more ambiguous legacy,
one wrought with both promise and failure. This is best
summed up by its North American Regional Secretary,
Theodore Olson:
The future of non-violent action depends on its relevance to
the major concerns of masses of men. A ‘way of life’ it may
be; a tool it must be, for the African on the land, . . . or for us
Westerners, deeply alienated from the sources of power . . .
It is this vision, of non-violence as a tool that people can use
to help themselves, to use on their own concerns, that the
WPB helped to project. Its failure to date is a failure to
respond to that vision . . . For this we need desperately what
the World Peace Brigade might have been. (1964, 40)
In short, as William James said, ‘The war against war
is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party’
(1911, 108).
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